Treitel defines an offer as “a declaration of willingness to contract under certain conditions, which is made with the intention that it becomes binding as soon as it is accepted by the person to whom it is addressed”, the “target recipient”.  An offer is a statement of the conditions to which the supplier is prepared to be bound. It is this contractual intention to be bound by a contract with certain and certain conditions communicated to the target shareholder. As a rule, the death (or incapacity) of the supplier terminates the offer. This does not apply to option contracts. An example of indefinite communication not being considered an offer occurred in Kolodziei v. Mason in 2014 in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In this case, it was a contractual dispute between a law student and a defense lawyer in a major murder case. A television station interviewed the lawyer and the lawyer to publicly illustrate that his client could not have committed the crime within the time frame demanded by the government, saying he would pay a million dollars to anyone who could make a trip from an airport to a nearby hotel during the time his client made the trip.  In the context of negotiations, the exact moment of conclusion of the contract is the moment when the parties reach a “point of no return” 92xKleinheisterkamp, in Vogenauer and Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), above n.
25, at 218. in the negotiation process and are bound by a contractual obligation. The time of conclusion of the contract is linked to the determination of the existence of the contract, because if no contract has been concluded, it is not possible to define the time of conclusion. As explained in section 4.2, the elements of the conclusion of the contract are found in the essential part of the negotiation. Therefore, the timing of the conclusion of the contract is also an essential part of the negotiations and is not related to the agreements and discussions that are part of the dynamic part of the negotiations. To illustrate this point, an example of negotiation can be considered. For example, the parties have negotiated a possible joint production of an innovative product in the future. Their negotiations have been developed intensively and generally cooperatively. The parties discussed the possible outcome that each of them expects from joint production, the possible role of each party in joint production and exchanged some data on their technical capabilities. At the first meeting, the parties set the dates for the meetings for next year and agreed that the contract should be concluded within three years.
After that, the negotiators informed each other about the new ideas each month. After a year, the question arose as to whether the parties were bound by contractual obligations. In other words, the question arose as to whether the “point of no return” had been reached in any way during those negotiations. When analyzing this example, the following can be said. The negotiations were cooperative, and the dynamic component was mainly developed (monthly meetings, planning for the conclusion of the agreement, negotiations lasted a year). However, the substantive component was much less developed (the parties only exchanged ideas on possible outcomes, but did not commit to agreeing on a concrete outcome of the negotiations). Since the doctrine of assessing the conclusion of the contract can be applied only to matters relating to the substantive element, it is likely that neither an offer, nor an acceptance, nor conduct showing agreement can be established in the negotiation of the example. Therefore, the time of conclusion of the contract cannot be identified. Therefore, the time of conclusion of the contract cannot be reached until an agreement has been reached on the essential part of the negotiations. This approach to the location of the time of conclusion of the contract can be compared with the views of the case-law on when the parties can be considered bound by a contractual obligation. There are three different assumptions about how the negotiations are conducted. The first hypothesis is rooted in nineteenth-century civil law theory, which states that negotiations develop in three progressive stages and that the parties become increasingly dependent on each other at each stage.93xG.
Faggella, `Dei Periodi Precontrattuali e della loro Vera ed Esatta Costruzione Scientifica`, in Studi Giuridici in Onore di Carlo Fadda pel XXV Anno del Suo Insegnamento (1906) 269; R. Saleilles, `De la Responsabilité Contractuelle: A Propos d`une Étude Nouvelle sur la Matière`, 6 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 697 (1907). See also E. Lein and B. Volders, “Liberté, Loyauté et Convergence: La Responsabilité Précontractuelle en Droit Comparé”, in J. Mestre (ed.), Regards Comparatistes sur le Phénomène Contractuel (2009) 17, p. 21. This hypothesis influenced legal thought in continental Europe.94xLein and Volders, c. 93; see e.B dutch law in Van Dunné, point 85 of this Opinion, p. 235. The second hypothesis supports the view of the law of England and Wales and states that the parties to the negotiations are not interdependent but, on the contrary, genuinely antagonistic.95xWalford v.
Meilen 1992] 2 AC 128. On this key case, see, inter alia, N. Andrews, Contract Law (2011), 23-30; A. Mills and R. Loveridge, “The Uncertain Future of Walford v. Miles` 4 Lloyd`s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 528 (2011), p. 528 et seq.; E. Peel, “Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith,” in A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds.), Contract Formation and Parties (2010) 37.
Finally, the third hypothesis is that the behaviour of the parties to the negotiations is “chaotic”; it is mentioned by commentators on the UNIDROIT principles.96xKleinheisterkamp, in Vogenauer and Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), No. 25, p. 218. In addition to these assumptions, an attempt was made to assess the importance of the non-contractual relationship when concluding the contract. For example, it has been argued that non-contractual relationships are more important in business than contractual relationships.97xThis view is often referred to as the Wisconsin School of Law and Sociology. See S. Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” 28 American Sociological Review 55 (1963), and a follow-up article by S. Macaulay, “An Empirical View of Contract,” 1985 Wisconsin Law Review 465 (1985). For further empirical research on the process of commercial transactions, see H. Beale and T.
Dugdale, “Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies,” 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45 (1975). Researchers who support the importance of non-contractual relationships in law have argued that a variety of grounds other than the law govern the negotiation, conclusion and performance of contracts. The negotiating parties may therefore become interdependent due to non-contractual obligations. According to this view, informal practices and agreements are an integral part of contract negotiations and also of the contract. Other scholars who object to the importance of the non-contractual relationship in contract formation have argued that contract law plays an important role in ex ante regulation of how the parties shape long-term relationships.98xA. . . .